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NOTES
A CONSTITUTIONAL INTEREST IN PUBLIC
EMPLOYMENT: THE LAST HURRAH?-
BISHOP V. WOOD
The desire for efficient and flexible governmental procedures, and the
need to recognize and protect the rights of the individual, often emerge
as conflicting interests. One of the most difficult questions generated by
these interests and presented to the courts for resolution has been
whether a public employee has a constitutionally protected interest in
his job. In Bishop v. Wood, I the Supreme Court dealt with the plaintiffs
contention that the failure to provide him notice and a hearing regarding
his dismissal from his job deprived him of property and liberty without
due process as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Carl Bishop
had been a police officer for the City of Marion, North Carolina, and
had been classified as a permanent employee. On March 31, 1972, the
City Manager privately notified him that he was being discharged due
to his failure to follow orders, poor attendance at police training classes,
causing low morale and conduct unbecoming to an officer. Bishop was
allowed neither a pre-termination nor a post-termination hearing during
which he could refute the charges against him.
Bishop brought a §1983 suit in federal district court against the City
Manager, the Police Chief and the City,2 and that court granted sum-
mary judgment to the defendants.3 Applying North Carolina state law,
the court held that Bishop did not have either a property interest or a
liberty interest in his employment. Since he had not alleged that he was
1. 96 S. Ct. 2074 (1976).
2. Jurisdiction was based on 42 U.S.C. §1983 (1970) and 28 U.S.C. §§1331(a), 1343(3)
(1970). Section 1983 provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depri-
vation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or
other proper proceeding for redress.
Section 1331(a) provides for federal court jurisdiction when a "federal question" is in-
volved and the matter in controversy exceeds the value of $10,000. Section 1343(3) pro-
vides for federal court jurisdiction to redress state deprivation of equal rights secured by
the Constitution or federal law.
3. Bishop v. Wood, 377 F. Supp. 501 (W.D. N.C. 1973), aff'd, 498 F.2d 1341 (4th Cir.
1974), aff'd, 96 S. Ct. 2074 (1976).
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fired for impermissible constitutional reasons or as retribution for exer-
cising First Amendment rights, he was not entitled to a formal hearing
either prior to or after his dismissal.' This decision was affirmed by the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.5 The Supreme Court granted certiorari
and in a five to four decision affirmed the district court's holding.
This Note will examine Bishop's claims to Fourteenth Amendment
property and liberty interests in light of recent Supreme Court preced-
ent. It will argue that the Court incorrectly adopted the reasoning of the
district court. Finally, it will offer some suggestions as to the general
implications of Bishop, as well as reasons why procedural protections
are desirable in public employee discharge cases.'
BIsHop's PROPERTY RIGHT CLAIM
In cases involving the discharge of government employees, courts have
distinguished between employment at the pleasure of the employer, and
situations in which the job is held subject to certain requirements being
met by the employee so that discharge must be "for cause." If causes of
removal are specified in a statute, there is an express property right and
notice and hearing are required.7 Additionally, an implied property right
4. Id. at 505. The court implied that if Bishop had claimed his dismissal was based upon
his exercise of other constitutionally protected rights, he might have fared better in seek-
ing to invoke procedural due process protections. Id. This follows earlier cases holding that
a government cannot deny a job on any basis that infringes constitutional freedoms,
regardless of the employee's contractual or other claim to the job. See Perry v. Sinder-
mann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972) (freedom of speech); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563
(1968) (freedom of speech); Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) (freedom
of speech); Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (freedom of religion); Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (freedom of association); Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350
U.S. 551 (1956) (right against self-incrimination). On the other hand, the exercise of First
or Fifth Amendment rights may not always provide absolute protection against dismissal.
A balancing of interests test has been held appropriate in some cases. See Pickering v.
Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568-69 (1968). Some of the factors to be considered by the
court include: (1) need for maintaining discipline among co-workers; (2) need for confiden-
tiality; (3) statements which impede employee's proper performance of his duties; (4)
statements that tend to show incompetency to perform the job; and (5) situations which
require close and personal working relationships. Donahue v. Staunton, 471 F.2d 475, 481
(7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 955 (1973).
5. Bishop v. Wood, 498 F.2d 1341 (4th Cir. 1974) (per curiam), aff'd, 96 S. Ct. 2074
(1976). The dissenting opinion of Judge Winter agreed with Bishop's claims that he had
both an interest in property and that he had been deprived of his liberty as a result of
the dismissal. Id. at 1341-42.
6. It should be noted that the City also raised jurisdictional issues in its defense.
Petitioner's Brief at 3-7, 96 S. Ct. 2074 (1976). Since the Court ignored these arguments,
this Note will not deal with them.
7. See Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974); Shurtleff v. United States, 189 U.S. 311
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has been found when circumstances create an expectation that employ-
ment will continue.8
Bishop based his claim to the right of a pre-termination hearing upon
both an express and an implied property right to continued employ-
ment. He alleged that the City of Marion's Personnel Ordinance9 con-
ferred an express property right by limiting discharges to specific "for
cause" reasons. Bishop also alleged that his classification as a
"permanent" employee and his length of service impliedly created a
sufficient expectancy of continued employment to constitute a pro-
tected property interest. He relied upon the Court's holding in Perry v.
Sindermann,10 in which proof of an implied agreement or unwritten
"common law" was found to be equivalent to tenure. In Perry's compan-
ion case, Board of Regents v. Roth,' I the Court stated that "[piroperty
interests ... are not created by the Constitution. Rather they are cre-
ated and their dimensions defined by existing rules or understandings
that stem from an independent source such as state law ... ."'I How-
(1903); Reagan v. United States, 182 U.S. 419 (1901); Indiana State Employees Ass'n v.
Boehning, 511 F.2d 834 (7th Cir.), rev'd. on other grounds, 423 U.S. 6 (1975). If there is
no "cause" requirement, employment can be terminated at will. See Miller v. School
Dist., 500 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1974); Abeyta v. Town of Taso, 499 F.2d 323 (10th Cir. 1974);
Suckle v. Madison Gen. Hosp., 499 F.2d 1364 (7th Cir. 1974).
8. See notes 10-13 and accompanying text infra.
9. Article II, §6 of the Personnel Ordinance of the City of Marion, reads as follows:
Dismissal. A permanent employee whose work is not satisfactory over a period
of time shall be notified in what way his work is deficient and what he must do
if his work is to be satisfactory. If a permanent employee fails to perform work
up to the standard of the classification held, or continues to be negligent, ineffi-
cient, or unfit to perform his duties, he may be dismissed by the City Manager.
Any discharged employee shall be given written notice of his discharge setting
forth the effective date and reasons for his discharge if he shall request such a
notice.
96 S. Ct. at 2077, citing MARION, N.C., PERSONNEL ORDINANCE art. II, §6.
10. Bishop v. Wood, 377 F. Supp. 501, 503 (W.D. N.C. 1973), citing Perry v. Sinder-
mann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). In Perry, a discharged university professor alleged a right to a
pre-termination hearing, claiming that his dismissal was in retaliation for his public
criticism of the Board of Regents. He alleged a violation of Fourteenth Amendment due
process rights. The Court held that his lack of tenure did not defeat his procedural due
process claim because of an established de facto tenure system at the college. The Court
stated that "[a] person's interest in a benefit is a 'property' interest for due process
purposes if there are such rules or mutually explicit understandings that support his claim
of entitlement to the benefit .. " 408 U.S. at 601.
11. 408 U.S. 564 (1972). For a more in-depth discussion, see Smith & Gebala, Job
Security for Public Employees, 31 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 545 (1974); Note, Constitutional
Law-Procedural Due Process-The Right of a Non-tenured Teacher Upon Non-renewal
of his Contract at a State School, 22 DEPAUL L. REv. 703 (1973).
12. 408 U.S. at 577.
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ever, Bishop's claim of entitlement would have to be more than an
abstract need or desire.'3
The Bishop Court followed Roth by stating that the existence of any
property interest must be determined by reference to state law. 4 The
Court stated that state law in this matter had been established by Still
v. Lance, 5 a North Carolina Supreme Court decision. Based on Still, the
Bishop Court stated that its impression of North Carolina law was that
a property right in public employment can exist "only if the employer,
by statute or contract, has actually given some form of guarantee."'"
However, the Court also noted that no North Carolina court had inter-
preted the ordinance involved in Bishop. Therefore, the Court deferred
to the district court's interpretation of the Marion ordinance, in reliance
on that court's expertise in North Carolina law. 7
An examination of the district court's opinion in Bishop indicates that
the Supreme Court's deference to that opinion was an unfortunate error.
The district court had examined Still in reaching its decision in Bishop.
In Still, a non-tenured teacher dismissed at the end of the school year
claimed the right to a hearing. The state statute'" governing teacher
termination contained no "cause" requirement which would confer a
property right in continued employment. The North Carolina court
therefore concluded that a contract of employment which expressly re-
fers to the employment as a "regular, permanent job," but which con-
tains no provision for the job's duration or termination is "terminable
at the will of either party."'" The court in Still had reached its conclu-
sion after an analysis of the terms of the state statute involved, the
legislative history of the statute, the consequences of a teacher being
terminated at the end of the school year, and the nature of school opera-
tions.8 However, unlike the Still court, the district court in Bishop did
not undertake any type of similarly comprehensive analysis. Most im-
portantly, the district court did not analyze the terms of the Marion
13. Id. See note 45 infra for cases in which courts have found the existence of an implied
property interest.
14. 96 S. Ct. at 2077-78.
15. 279 N.C. 254, 182 S.E.2d 403 (1971).
16. 96 S. Ct. at 2078.
17. Id.
18. N.C. GEN. STAT. §115-142 (1975).
19. 279 N.C. at 257, 182 S.E.2d at 406. It should be noted that the statute construed in
Still dealt with school teachers' contracts and not with municipal employees. This holding
was reaffirmed by the North Carolina Supreme Court in Nantz v. Employment Security
Comm'n, 290 N.C. 473, 266 S.E.2d 340 (1976), in a case involving a discharged state
employee.
20. 279 N.C. at 259-63, 182 S.E.2d at 406-10.
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ordinance to determine if a "cause" requirement was contained therein.
Rather, the district court begged the entire question, by simply repeat-
ing in Bishop the Still conclusion that "the plaintiff held his position
at the will and pleasure of the city." 2'
While the Bishop district court did not analyze the ordinance for
"cause" provisions, it did examine the procedural protections provided
in the ordinance and found that notice and hearing were not thereby
required.22 This finding of a lack of procedural protection was put for-
ward as further support for the conclusion that no property right ex-
isted.2 As Justice White argued in his dissent in Bishop,"' the district
court's analysis, which based the existence of a property right on proce-
dural provisions, is exactly the type of reasoning rejected by six mem-
bers of the Supreme Court in Arnett v. Kennedy.25 In Arnett, the peti-
tioner claimed entitlement to a pre-termination hearing to protect his
property interest. A divided Court held that the statute in question, the
Lloyd-LaFollete Act," did have a "cause" requirement for discharge,
thus creating a property interest in continued federal employment.27
21. 377 F. Supp. at 504. The majority's conclusion in Bishop can be criticized further
on the ground that due to factual distinctions between the two cases, the district court's
reliance on Still was misplaced. See 96 S. Ct. at 2086 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Bishop's
situation was more nearly analogous to that of a teacher dismissed during the term of his
contract. In that situation, a teacher would be entitled to notice and a pre-termination
hearing. N.C. GEN. STAT. § §115-142(f) (1975). It also could be argued that Bishop's situa-
tion is not comparable at all with that of a discharged school teacher. In most states,
public education is considered to be a responsibility of the state, whereas public safety is
essentially a local government function. Compare ILL. CONST. art. X, §1 and art. VII, §8,
with art. VII, §6(a). Thus, reliance on a teacher tenure statute to determine whether a
municipality's police employee has a property interest in his job may not be justified.
22. 377 F. Supp. at 504.
23. Id.
24. 96 S. Ct. at 2083-85 (White, J., dissenting).
25. 416 U.S. 134 (1974). In Arnett, a non-probationary federal employee was discharged
as a result of his accusations against his supervisor relating to an alleged bribe offer to a
third party. Arnett was found not to be entitled to a pre-termination hearing, because he
had a statutory right to a trial-type post-termination hearing which was deemed to be
sufficient procedural protection. If Arnett prevailed at the hearing, both his property and
liberty interests would be vindicated by the opportunity to clear his reputation and by
reinstatement with back pay. The Court's finding was achieved by a balancing of interests
test applied by three concurring Justices. For an in-depth discussion of the case, see
Comment, Fear of Firing: Arnett v. Kennedy and the Protection of Federal Career
Employees, 10 HARv. Civ. RzrHws-Civ. LiB. L. Rav. 472 (1975). Bishop, unlike Arnett,
received no hearing.
26. 5 U.S.C. §7501(a) (1970). The Act provides that "[ain individual in the competi-
tive service may be removed or suspended without pay only for such cause as will promote
the efficiency of the service."
27. 416 U.S. at 151-52.
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Nevertheless, no due process protection beyond that provided for in the
Act was required.28
The plurality opinion in Arnett stated that the protection to be ac-
corded Arnett's property interest could constitutionally be defined by
the procedural provisions in the Act. However, six Justices, in concur-
ring and dissenting opinions, expressly disclaimed the plurality's
theory.2" They found that a property right is expressly created by the
inclusion of a "cause" requirement in the statute, independent of any
statutory procedural provisions." It was stressed that once the substan-
tive property right is found, the right to procedural due process, includ-
ing notice and a hearing, is conferred by constitutional guarantee, not
by legislative grace."
28. See note 25 supra. In Arnett, Justice White utilized the balancing test previously
employed in Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886 (1961), cited in 416 U.S. at 188
(White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part). There the Court weighed the govern-
ment's interest in the unilateral dismissal of a "security risk" employee against the em-
ployee's interest in avoiding a badge of infamy and foreclosure of other employment
opportunities. 367 U.S. at 898.
29. Justice White stated:
I differ basically with the plurality's view that . . . "the property interest which
appellee had in his employment was itself conditioned by the procedural limita-
tions which had accompanied the grant of that interest .. " The rationale of
this position quickly leads to the conclusion that even though the statute re-
quires cause for discharge, the requisites of due process could equally have been
satisfied had the law dispensed with any hearing at all ....
416 U.S. at 177-78 (White, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
Justice Marshall agreed, saying "[allthough appellee's property interest arose from
statute, the deprivation of his claim of entitlement to continued employment would have
to meet minimum standards of procedural due process regardless of the discharge proce-
dures provided by the statute." Id. at 211 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
Justice White also noted that "[wihile the State may define what is and what is not
property, once having defined those rights the Constitution defines due process, and as I
understand it six members of the Court are in agreement on this fundamental proposi-
tion." Id. at 185.
30. Id. at 166 (Powell, J., concurring).
31. Id. at 167. After Arnett, federal courts generally followed the opinions expressed by
the six Justices and rejected the Arnett plurality's theory that the statute creating a right
also can limit the procedures for vindicating the right. See, e.g., Thurston v. Dekle, 531
F.2d 1264 (5th Cir. 1976); Jones v. Penny, 387 F. Supp. 383 (M.D. N.C. 1974); Watson v.
Branch County Bank, 380 F. Supp. 945 (W.D. Mich. 1974); Johnson v. Board of Regents,
377 F. Supp. 227 (W.D. Wis. 1974), aff'd mer., 510 F.2d 975 (7th Cir. 1975). But see Ring
v. Schlesinger, 502 F.2d 479 (D.C. Cir. 1974). Note that some courts construed Arnett as
holding simply that pre-termination hearings are not required. See, e.g., McFarland v.
United States, 517 F.2d 938, 944-45 (Ct. Cl. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1049 (1976);
Brubaker v. Board of Educ., 502 F.2d 973, 988 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 965
(1975). Other courts found that the procedures upheld in Arnett defined minimal due
[Vol. 26:631
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Justice Stevens, writing for the majority in Bishop, distinguished
Arnett on the grounds that in the latter case the entire Court had recog-
nized that the cause requirements of the statute created a property right
in continued employment. Therefore, the only remaining question was
whether the protection of that right could be defined and limited by
statutory provisions. Six Justices concluded that it could not. Justice
Stevens emphasized that in Bishop the district court had determined
that no property right existed.32 Therefore, any procedures set forth in
the ordinance were merely legislative provisions to be complied with and
irrelevant to Bishop's constitutional claims.33
The attempted distinction of Arnett is logically unsound, due to the
defects in the opinion of the district court, upon which it is based. First,
the district court's conclusion that in Bishop no property right existed
was reached without an examination of the Marion ordinance for
"cause" requirements, and was therefore faulty and incomplete.3' A
proper analysis reveals that the Marion ordinance does appear to condi-
tion dismissals on cause, by citing negligence, inefficiency or unfitness
as grounds for removal. Therefore, the district court should have found
that Bishop was granted a property right in his job. Further, the district
court did not merely cite the ordinance as containing procedural protec-
tions which demanded compliance. Instead, the district court found
that virtually no procedural protections were required and therefore
concluded that no property right existed. The plurality in Arnett pro-
posed to limit an admittedly existing property right by the procedural
provisions of the statute. The Bishop district court proposed to consider
procedural protections in determining whether a property right existed.
Neither of these two propositions can succeed in light of the opinion of
the six Justices in Arnett that a property right is established by a stat-
ute's "cause" provisions, not by its procedural allowances. Once the
property right in employment is found to exist, it is the Federal Consti-
tution, rather than state law, which should be used to determine the
procedures required for the termination of that employment and the
extinction of that property right.36
The district court's Bishop opinion, as subsequently adopted by the
Supreme Court, was issued prior to the Arnett decision. This fact clearly
process. See, e.g., Davis v. Vandiver, 494 F.2d 830, 832-33 (5th Cir. 1974); Eley v. Morris,
390 F. Supp. 913, 920 (W.D. Ga. 1975).
32. 96 S. Ct. at 2078 n.8.
33. Id. at 2078.
34. See notes 18-21 and accompanying text supra.
35. 377 F. Supp. at 504.
36. See notes 29-31 and accompanying text supra.
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should have been sufficient grounds for the Supreme Court to conduct
its own analysis of the Bishop problem, in light of Arnett.37 The Supreme
Court, by simply adopting the district court's opinion, has completely
disregarded the concept of constitutionally mandated procedural due
process, as described by the six Justices in Arnett. The effect of Bishop
could be that property rights will be defined through legislative enact-
ment and limited or even determined simply by failure of the legislature
to provide a procedure whereby the interest can be vindicated.38
Although the Supreme Court found that Bishop had no express prop-
erty right in his job, the effect of that finding could have been nullified
through a full analysis of Bishop's other property right claim. Such an
analysis would have dealt with Bishop's allegation, under Perry and
Roth, that the facts surrounding his employment had created an im-
plied property right.39 In dealing with this claim, the Court should have
looked for "rules or understandings that stem from an independent
source such as state law ... ."40 However, the Bishop Court apparently
read this phrase very narrowly, and took the words "such as state law"
to be words of exclusion, rather than words of example. The Court
therefore failed to analyze the surrounding circumstances or the ordi-
nance to determine whether Bishop had any legitimate expectancy of
continued employment. Instead, the Court looked only to the district
court's interpretation of state law and prior Supreme Court cases, and
ignored the clearly implied promise of continued employment, the past
37. Such an approach would have been the most desirable way to deal with the prob-
lem; the Court also could have reversed the district court's decision and remanded the
case for further proceedings not inconsistent with Arnett.
38. It also can be asserted that with the Bishop holding, the Court is further strengthen-
ing the once-discredited "right-privilege" doctrine. Historically, public employment was
considered to be a privilege, not a right, and the employees' rights could be infringed by
the state as an employer. See Bailey v. Richardson, 341 U.S. 918 (1951) (per curiam);
McAuliffe v. Mayor of New Bedford, 155 Mass. 216, 29 N.E. 517 (1892). The doctrine
gradually had been eroded as the expansion of government into the private sector of
society created a dependency relationship between citizens and the state. See Reich, The
New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964). See generally Van Alstyne, The Demise of the
Right-Privilege Distinction in Constitutional Law, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1439 (1968). By ex-
tending constitutional protection to state-created entitlements, the state was foreclosed
from arbitrarily depriving citizens of opportunities and monetary benefits. The "right-
privilege" distinction was rejected in Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254, 262 (1970). It was
repeatedly disapproved in subsequent cases. See, e.g., Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564, 571 (1972); Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972). See also Keyishian v. Board
of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967); Greene v. McElroy, 360 U.S. 474 (1959); Wieman v.
Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952).
39. See notes 10-13 and accompanying text supra.
40. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972) (emphasis added).
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employment practices of the City4' and the objective expectations of
Bishop arising out of his classification as a permanent employee.,,
Under a more expansive approach, the Court could have examined the
surrounding facts and inquired as to whether it was "objectively reason-
able for [Bishop] to believe he could rely on continued employment."'"
The classification of permanent employee could be said to be a guaran-
tee of removal only for cause and lends credibility to Bishop's claim of
entitlement."
The state of the law regarding property interests in public employ-
ment under Perry and Roth was confused and had led to conflicting
decisions in the lower courts. 5 Bishop works both to clarify and reduce
41. Bishop was the only officer discharged, for cause or otherwise, from the time of his
hiring in June, 1969, until pretrial discovery. 96 S. Ct. at 2082 n.5.
42. The district court based its analysis of Bishop's claim to an implied property right
on Perry. See note 10 supra. The court found Bishop distinguishable because Perry con-
tended his discharge was based on his exercise of First Amendment rights, whereas Bishop
made no such constitutional claim. 377 F. Supp. at 503-04. The district court was clearly
in error, for the Supreme Court stated in Perry that "the respondent's lack of a contractual
or tenure 'right' to re-employment for the 1969-1970 academic year is immaterial to his
free speech claim." 408 U.S. at 597-98. The Supreme Court considered Perry's free speech
claim separately from his right to a hearing based on the existence of an implied property
right through the de facto tenure system. Id. at 599.
Because of its interpretation of Perry, the district court failed to examine either the
Marion Personnel Ordinance as an "independent source" or the surrounding circumstan-
ces, thus foreclosing any finding of an implied property right. Instead, the district court
looked only to Still, in which the existence of an implied property right was not at issue.
See notes 18-21, and accompanying text supra.
43. Id. at 2082 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
44. The existence of an implied property right can be determined by an examination
of the particular statutory enactment involved. Still would not foreclose finding an im-
plied right in Bishop because it did not interpret the Marion ordinance, but dealt with a
state statute.
Perhaps the Bishop Court's approach could have been foreseen, for Chief Justice Burger
filed a concurring opinion to both Roth and Perry in which he made it clear that state
law, not constitutional common law, should govern the public employee's job security.
Further, he felt that federal courts should abstain from determining entitlement to due
process and defer to state interpretation when the question arises. 408 U.S. at 603-04
(Burger, C.J., concurring). The result in Bishop was predicted by two commentators,
based upon Burger's concurrence. Smiith & Gebala, supra note 11, at 559. The authors
saw deference to state law as a retreat from the Court's earlier willingness to develop
judge-made rules to implement constitutional rights, concluding that "[t]he result may
be a substantial limitation on the potential impact of these two important decisions on
the rights of public employees." Id.
45. In analyzing the lower federal court cases which have dealt with this issue, one must
compare those situations in which a discharged employee has some form of tenure or other
protections, as in Buhr v. Buffalo Public School Dist., 509 F.2d 1196 (8th Cir. 1974), or
Eley v. Morris, 390 F. Supp. 913 (N.D. Ga. 1975), with those in which there is no formal
19771
DEPAUL LA W REVIEW
the rights of public employees to notice and hearing before discharge."
Unlike Perry and Roth, Bishop indicates that the Court will not be
willing to examine the totality of the circumstances to determine
whether a public employee has a legitimate claim of entitlement to
continued employment. 7 Not only will Bishop provide guidance to lower
contract or mutually explicit understanding about the duration of the employment.
Bishop is an example of the latter situation. In such cases, some courts have found the
requisite expectancy of continued employment or a de facto tenure system which would
give rise to due process requirements. An interesting North Carolina case interpreted Still
(the cornerstone of the Bishop holding) and found a protected property interest. See
Thomas v. Ward, 374 F. Supp. 206 (M.D. N.C. 1974). There the court found that language
in a pamphlet distributed by the school system was sufficient to lead the plaintiff to
believe that he had tenure. Another court found that a Police Chief had a justifiable
expectancy of continued employment which necessitated a full pre-termination hearing
complying with procedural due process. Dahlinger v. Town Bd. of Delavan, 381 F. Supp.
474 (E.D. Wis. 1974). See also Roane v. Callisburg Ind. School Dist., 511 F.2d 633 (5th
Cir. 1975); Muir v. County Council, 393 F. Supp. 915 (D. Del. 1975). However, other courts
have refused to find an implied property interest, absent a formal contract or some other
form of statutory entitlement. In McNeil v. Butz, 480 F.2d 314 (4th Cir. 1973), the court
held that no property interest was created, despite plaintiff's longevity, based on fourteen
years of service. Another court refused to order a pre-termination hearing because plaintiff
had no formal employment contract, despite a city ordinance allowing removal only "for
cause." See Schoonfield v. Mayor of Baltimore, 399 F. Supp. 1068 (D. Md. 1975). That
court followed Arnett, by holding that a post-termination hearing was enough due process.
In Illinois, non-probationary municipal police and fire employees (in cities over 5,000
population) are protected under a statute which allows dismissals only for cause and
provides for notice and a pre-termination hearing. ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 24, § 10-2.7-17 (1975).
Other municipal employees are protected only if the municipality passes a referendum to
establish a Civil Service System. ILL. Rav. STAT. ch. 24, §§10-1-1, 10-1-18, 10-1-43 (1975).
Probationary or untenured employees generally have no property interest in continued
employment. See, e.g., Gray v. Union County Intermediate Educ. Dist., 520 F.2d 803 (9th
Cir. 1975); Canty v. Board of Educ. 470 F.2d 1111 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S.
907 (1973). For other instances where courts have refused to find a protected property
interest, see Brouilette v. Board of Directors, 519 F.2d 126 (8th Cir. 1975) (automatic
renewal of teaching contract creates no expectation of continued re-employment); Slegeski
v. Ilg, 395 F. Supp. 1253 (D. Conn. 1975) (no formal contract or mutually explicit under-
standings protected probationary police officer); Weyenberg v. Menasha, 401 F. Supp. 801
(E.D. Wis. 1975) (contract terminable at will of board creates no property interest).
46. In a footnote, the majority noted that the impression created by the dissenting
opinions is that the holding is a significant retreat from past practice. Cases requiring
reinstatement of discharged employees were said to be extremely rare. 96 S. Ct. at 2080
n.14. Technically, the statement is correct-few lower courts have ordered reinstatement
as a remedy. Yet many have ordered the employing agency to provide some kind of
procedural protection, including notice and a hearing. See note 45 supra.
47. One commentator had read into Perry the Court's recognition of an implied contrac-
tual right to continued employment. Note, Implied Contract Rights to Job Security, 26
STAN. L. REV. 335 (1974). Such a right was to be determined by the common law of the
job, including the nature of the job and the treatment of other similarly situated employ-
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courts, but it also could result in a reduction in the number of similar
federal court actions in the future."8
BISHOP'S DEPRIVATION OF LIBERTY CLAIM
Bishop, relying upon Roth, also claimed that his discharge amounted
to a deprivation of liberty because the seriousness of the reasons given
for the discharge constituted a stigma which severely damaged his repu-
tation. Roth had enunciated the criteria to be applied when a depriva-
tion of liberty was alleged, which included a consideration of whether
ees. Id. at 356. See also Frels, Teachers' Rights, 39 TEx. B.J. 508 (1976). Longevity might
also be considered when determining the legitimacy of an employee's expectation of job
security. It also was suggested that once an employee completes his probationary period
and is classified as a permanent employee, he should be regarded as having attained an
objective expectancy of continued employment. Smith & Gebala, supra note 11, at 562.
It should be noted that the "expectancy doctrine" was adopted by the Fifth Circuit Court
of Appeals in Sindermann v. Perry, 430 F.2d 943 (5th Cir. 1970), and by some other
circuits, but was never expressly adopted by the Supreme Court. See generally Greene v.
Howard Univ., 412 F.2d 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Johnson v. Branch, 364 F.2d 177 (4th Cir.
1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1003 (1967); Bomar v. Keyes, 162 F.2d 136 (2d Cir. 1947).
Under Bishop, however, these suggested tests for defining a property right are no longer
operable.
48. The effect of the holding in Bishop may be a restricted willingness of the courts to
require that due process rights be granted in other substantive areas where claims of
property or liberty infringement are made. See Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972)
(right to hearing before revocation of parole); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67 (1972) (right
to notice and hearing before repossession of chattels); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535 (1971)
(right to due process procedures prior to suspension of driver's license); Goldberg v. Kel-
ley, 397 U.S. 254 (1970) (right to a hearing before termination of welfare benefits); Snia-
dach v. Family Finance Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969) (right to notice and hearing before
garnishment of wages). As late as 1975, the Court held that due process protections are
required when liberty interests are infringed by governmental action. Goss v. Lopez, 419
U.S. 565 (1975) (notice and hearing required before public school can suspend student for
less than ten days).
However, in a decision rendered just before Bishop, the Court held that a hearing is not
required prior to termination of disability benefits under Social Security. Mathews v.
Eldridge, 96 S. Ct. 893 (1976). The Court delineated three factors which must be examined
in such cases: (1) the private interest affected by the action; (2) the risk of erroneous
deprivation by the procedures used and the value of additional safeguards; and (3) the
government's interest and the burdens that additional procedures would entail. Id. at 903.
Perhaps this indicates an attempt by the Court to chart separate courses, insofar as liberty
and property interests are concerned. However, the future of new claims to procedural
protections, especially when a purported property interest is involved, can only be termed
unsettled. For example, some commentators have claimed that Fuentes was reversed by
Mitchell v. W.T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600 (1974). See Note, Provisional Remedies and Due
Process in Default-Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 1974 WASH. U. L.Q. 653 (1974). But see
Comment, Creditor Remedies and Due Process: Comparing Mitchell and Fuentes, 10
URBAN L. ANN. 243 (1975).
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petitioner's standing in the community was damaged; whether his good
name, reputation or honor was at stake; and whether any stigma at-
tached to the discharge." The Bishop Court did not examine the facts
to determine whether these criteria applied to Bishop. Instead, the
Court found that Bishop was still free to seek another position, since the
City Manager had not publicized the reasons for his dismissal and,
therefore, had not damaged his reputation. 0
The Bishop Court's publication requirement is yet another prerequi-
site to the finding of a deprivation of liberty.5 Neither Roth nor Arnett
specifically stated that in order for a deprivation of liberty to occur the
employer had to publicize the reasons for the discharge. In fact, Arnett
appeared to continue a somewhat expansive construction of the concept
that "[l]iberty is not offended by the dismissal itself, but instead by a
dismissal based upon an unsupported charge which could wrongfully
injure the reputation of an employee."52 Yet, the Bishop majority indi-
cates that publication is of crucial importance, and that an independent
examination of the factual circumstances is not to be undertaken by the
court when analyzing a deprivation of liberty claim."
The concept of due process rights attaching when petitioner claims a
deprivation of liberty in an employment discharge situation has defi-
nitely been restricted by Bishop. As early as 1959, the Court in Greene
v. McElroy,' held that Greene had been deprived of his liberty and
property by the revocation of his security clearance, which severely lim-
ited his employment opportunities. This concept continued to be viable
in discharge cases,55 for courts were normally willing to examine the
49. 408 U.S. at 573.
50. 96 S. Ct. at 2079-80.
51. See text accompanying note 49 supra.
52. 416 U.S. at 157.
53. See text accompanying notes 49-50 supra. Bishop was one of three cases decided
during the Court's 1975 term which dealt with procedural protections to be accorded under
the Fourteenth Amendment. See Paul v. Davis, 96 S. Ct. 1155 (1976) (inclusion of plain-
tiff's name on an "Active Shoplifter's" list distributed to merchants not a deprivation of
liberty which required due process protection); Meachum v. Fano, 96 S. Ct. 2532 (1976)
(transfer of a state prisoner from one institution to another not a deprivation of liberty
requiring due process protection). In all three cases, the Court's concern over federal
judicial interference in state affairs contributed to a restrictive view of what constitutes a
protected liberty interest. 96 S. Ct. at 1159, 2080, 2540. The Court's analysis indicates that
the existence of a protected interest under the Fourteenth Amendment will depend more
upon the presence of positive state enactments rather than upon informal indications that
a right has been created.
54. 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
55. It should be noted that the expansive interpretation of "deprivation of liberty"
accorded plaintiffs in actions against the state in other than employment situations has
[Vol. 26:631
BISHOP v. WOOD
facts of each situation to decide whether employment opportunities
were limited or whether other stigmatizing effects would result.', It is
recently been restricted by the Court. Compare Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433
(1971) (posting of plaintiff's name in liquor stores with the command that she could not
be sold liquor held to be sufficient deprivation of liberty to require notice and an opportun-
ity to be heard), with Paul v. Davis, 96 S. Ct. 1155 (1976) (inclusion of plaintiffs name
on "Active Shoplifters" list distributed to merchants did not deprive him of liberty be-
cause injury to reputation alone, without injury to some other tangible interest such as
employment, is not sufficient to invoke the procedural protections of the Fourteenth
Amendment). Dissenting at the appellate court level in Bishop, Judge Winter relied upon
Constantineau to find a deprivation of liberty. 498 F.2d at 1342 (Winter, J., dissenting).
However, Judge Winter's opinion was written prior to Paul.
56. Actual loss of employment opportunities or the existence of allegations as to the
employee's integrity, veracity, professional competence, intelligence or mental stability
have usually been sufficient to establish a deprivation of liberty. For example, the Fourth
Circuit Court of Appeals found that the liberty interests of two non-civil service employees
were deprived when they were terminated without a hearing and disqualified permanently
from future employment with the agency. McNeill v. Butz, 480 F.2d 314 (4th Cir. 1973).
The court surmised that their disqualifications would foreclose them from employment
opportunities with other governmental units and would prejudice their private employ-
ment prospects. The court followed the normal procedure and utilized a balancing test to
find that the plaintiffs' interests outweighed the government's interest in the efficient and
orderly discharge of unsatisfactory employees. Id. at 322-23. Another court found a pro-
tected liberty interest where a probationary deputy sheriff was fired and sought a hearing.
Osmer v. Moiles, 409 F. Supp. 675 (E.D. Mich. 1975). The court held that the plaintiffs
claim of inability to obtain any position in law enforcement because of the discharge fell
within the Roth exception and entitled him to a hearing. Id. at 676. For other instances
where courts have found protected liberty interests, see Weyenberg v. Menasha, 401 F.
Supp. 801 (E.D. Wis. 1975) (elimination of police superintendent's job impeached his
integrity and pre-termination hearing required); Morris v. Board of Educ., 401 F. Supp.
188 (D. Del. 1975) (non-renewal of teacher's contract held potential for severely impairing
her ability to pursue her profession); Rew v. Ward, 402 F. Supp. 331 (D. N.M. 1975)
(discharge of airman could impair civilian employment with federal government and in
private sector because of likelihood that government would communicate derogatory infor-
mation in the future); Buggs v. City of Minneapolis, 358 F. Supp. 1340 (D. Minn. 1973)
(court found protected liberty interest despite City's argument that charges not made
public). See also Rolles v. Civil Serv. Comm'n, 512 F.2d 1319 (D.C. Cir. 1975); Lombard
v. Board of Educ., 502 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 976 (1975); Huntley
v. Board of Educ., 493 F.2d 1016 (4th Cir. 1974).
Other courts, however, have found no protected liberty interest which would entitle
plaintiff to notice and hearing prior to dismissal. The reasoning employed by such courts
was recently stated by the Ninth Circuit: "Nearly any reason assigned for dismissal is
likely to be to some extent a negative reflection on an individual's ability, temperament,
or character." Gray v. Union County Intermediate Educ. Dist., 520 F.2d 803, 806 (9th Cir.
1975). However, the evidence in Gray did not import serious defects such as dishonesty
or immorality. See also Slegeski v. Ilg, 395 F. Supp. 1253 (D. Conn. 1975), in which the
court held that a § 1983 suit was an improper forum to remedy subsequent statements by
the employer that the discharged employee was "no good." Since the employer's state-
ments were informal, and not part of any official record or reduced to writing, the plaintiff
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logical to assume that Carl Bishop's job prospects were limited by his
discharge, since prospective police employees usually are investigated
thoroughly by potential police employers." Even though the majority
opinion was predicated upon the fact that the reasons for Bishop's dis-
charge had not been published, the Court ignored the probability that
the City would convey those reasons to prospective employers. Justice
Brennan therefore argued that the Court's decision in Bishop has de-
stroyed the last vestige of protection for liberty, since an employer "may
tell an employee that he is being fired for some nonderogatory reason,
and then turn around and inform prospective employers that the em-
ployee was in fact discharged for a stigmatizing reason that will effec-
tively preclude future employment."
The Court also was not sympathetic to Bishop's claim that his liberty
was deprived because the reasons asserted for his dismissal were false.59
The Court stated that "[tihe truth or falsity of the City Manager's
statement ... neither enhances nor diminishes petitioner's claim that
his constitutionally protected interest in liberty has been impaired." 0
In dealing with Bishop's allegations that the reasons for his discharge
were false, the Court could have analyzed the dismissal to determine
whether Fourteenth Amendment due process guarantees of a substan-
tive nature were violated."1 Using this approach, the Court could have
had no liberty interest to protect. See also Brouilette v. Board of Directors, 519 F.2d 126
(8th Cir. 1975) (charges against dismissed employees were minor and not made public);
Hostrop v. Board of Jr. College Dist., 523 F.2d 569 (7th Cir. 1975) (liberty interest not
deprived because plaintiff publicized Board's charges).
57. 96 S. Ct. at 2080 (Brennan, J., dissenting). A similar argument was the basis of the
Second Circuit's noting that a discharged employee may suffer deprivation of liberty.
Velger v. Cawley, 525 F.2d 334, 336 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 3188 (1976).
58. 96 S. Ct. at 2081 (Brennan, J., dissenting). This becomes an even harsher result
when it is considered that the truth or falsity of the stigmatizing reasons will have no
bearing on any deprivation of liberty claim. See notes 59-60 and accompanying text infra.
59. Plaintiff introduced evidence showing justification for missing the training classes,
plus affidavits from fellow officers regarding his co-operativeness, etc. Petitioner's Brief
at 9-12, 96 S. Ct. 2074 (1976).
60. 96 S. Ct. at 2080. The Court did concede that Bishop might have a claim in a state
court if he could prove that the City Manager deliberately lied.
61. The Court's approach to substantive due process review is similar to that employed
in a traditional equal protection analysis. In a case not involving a "suspect" classification
or a "fundamental" interest, the Court applies minimal scrutiny by following the "rule
of reasonableness." See San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1 (1973);
Jefferson v. Hackney, 406 U.S. 535 (1972); Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
Cases which do involve a "suspect" classification or a "fundamental" interest are re-
viewed under a strict scrutiny test. The state must advance a compelling interest which
the Court balances against the asserted individual interest. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S.
113 (1973); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1
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determined whether the discharge was a rational means of advancing a
valid interest of the City in providing good police protection, rather than
being based on an arbitrary, bureaucratic whim.2 Courts generally have
not had the occasion to extend such protection to public employees"
absent an infringement of some other constitutional right, such as
speech, association or privacy." Yet the Court has held that
"constitutional protection does extend to the public servant whose ex-
clusion . . . is patently arbitrary or discriminatory."" In Thompson v.
Gallagher," the Fifth Circuit utilized a Fourteenth Amendment sub-
stantive due process argument, although no other constitutionally pro-
tected right had been impaired. The court interpreted the Fourteenth
Amendment to be a "general prohibition against arbitrary and unrea-
(1967). See also Shaman, The Rule of Reasonableness in Constitutional Adjudication:
Toward the End of Irresponsible Judicial Review and the Establishment of a Viable
Theory of the Equal Protection Clause, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 153, 160 (1975).
62. In such an analysis the Court would consider the particular job held, the grounds
for discharge, the city's interests impaired by Bishop's continued employment and the
strength of the impairment from the cause given for discharge. In 1974, the Supreme Court
used a substantive due process analysis in Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. La Fleur, 414 U.S.
632 (1974), wherein it indicated that a substantive due process right, forbidding arbitrary
dismissal, exists and is to be defined independently of the procedural safeguards that
surround it. Id. at 648-50. For discussion as to how substantive due process doctrine could
be developed for public employees, see Comment, Substantive Due Process: The Extent
of Public Employees' Protection from Arbitrary Dismissal, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1647 (1974).
63. Unlike employees in the private sector, public employees are protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment due to the presence of state action. See Cafeteria Workers v.
McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 897-98 (1961). See generally Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S.
163 (1972); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
64. Comment, The Unclear Boundaries of the Constitutional Rights of Public
Employees, 44 U.M.K.C. L. REv. 389, 413 (1976), citing Comment, Substantive Due
Process: The Extent of Public Employees' Protection From Arbitrary Dismissal, 122 U.
PA. L. Rzv. 1647, 1648 (1974). However, a series of lower federal court cases have held that
public employment cannot be denied or terminated on grounds which are arbitrary, capri-
cious or unrelated to an ability to perform the job in question. See Burton v. Cascade
School Dist., 512 F.2d 850 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 839 (1975); Fisher v. Snyder,
476 F.2d 375 (8th Cir. 1973); Norton v. Macy, 417 F.2d 1161 (D.C. Cir. 1969); Fox v.
Washington, 396 F. Supp. 504 (D.D.C. 1975).
65. Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 192 (1952) (Oklahoma statute which required
each state officer and employee to take loyalty oath, in violation of First Amendment
rights of speech and association, violates Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment,
as an assertion of arbitrary power). For other decisions based on substantive due process
grounds, see Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207 (1971); Slochower v. Board of Educ.,
350 U.S. 551 (1956).
66. 489 F.2d 443 (5th Cir. 1973) (City's rule barring employment of veterans with less
than honorable discharges not a reasonable means of advancing a valid state interest, even
where no constitutionally protected interest other than the due process guarantee of the
Fourteenth Amendment was involved).
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sonable government action" in a discharge situation. 7
A substantive due process analysis, similar to the one used in
Thompson, could have been used by the Court in Bishop." Such analy-
sis would have required the City to advance at least a minimal argument
that the dismissal would further its interests in maintaining an efficient
police force and would have required some showing by the City that its
action was neither arbitrary nor discriminatory." However, the Bishop
Court did not utilize such an approach. The Court indicated that it
feared the federal courts could be flooded with suits by discharged pub-
lic employees. Such suits could be based upon nothing more than a
simple assertion that the dismissed employee's supervisor made a mis-
take.70
CONCLUSION
Bishop has significantly clarified the state of the law regarding the
protections of property and liberty interests to be accorded public em-
ployees. Bishop indicates that to find a deprivation of liberty interest,
which will trigger procedural due process requirements, a fairly serious
charge against the employee will be required. The charges will have to
have been made public by the employer prior to or at the time of the
discharge. Being rendered effectively unable to find employment in
one's chosen profession will no longer suffice as proof of deprivation."
Additionally, the Court has signaled a strong warning to the lower courts
to approach future deprivation of liberty claims with caution, as evi-
denced by the majority's statement that "[wie must accept the harsh
fact that numerous individual mistakes are inevitable in the day-to-day
administration of our affairs .... The Due Process Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment is not a guarantee against incorrect or ill-advised
personnel decisions.""
67. Id. at 446. Note that Thompson differs significantly from earlier cases which, in
addition to a substantive due process argument, involved violations of other constitution-
ally protected rights. See note 65 supra.
68. The substantive due process approach was re-affirmed by the Supreme Court in
Kelley v. Johnson, 96 S. Ct. 1440 (1976), where the Court noted "[tihe constitutional
issue to be decided . . . is whether [the] determination that such regulations should be
enacted is so irrational that it may be branded 'arbitrary'...." Id. at 1446.
69. In essence, Bishop claimed his discharge was discriminatory, being based upon the
reasons that "he enforced the law fairly and equally and without evincing any political or
social favoritism." Brief for Petitioner at 12, 96 S. Ct. 2074 (1976).
70. 96 S. Ct. at 2080. See note 72 and accompanying text infra.
71. See notes 57-58 and accompanying text supra.
72. 96 S. Ct. at 2080. One concept which has not yet been negated by the Supreme
Court is that the Administrative Procedure Act provides a judicial remedy for a discharged
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A more far-reaching effect of Bishop could be that the Supreme Court
has placed extensive power to define property rights and the procedural
protection to be accorded them in the hands of state and local legislative
bodies. This would be accomplished through a legislative decision as to
the inclusion of "cause" provisions and procedural protections in the
governing statute. The effect of this legislative power could well be that
those groups of public employees without political clout to affect
changes, such as collective bargaining statutes or civil service systems,
will be at the mercy of majoritarian sentiment. Such a result is ironic
in light of the express provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Legislatures should be encouraged to grant procedural protections to
public employees." Recent psychological studies have noted several in-
terrelated factors which lead to the conclusion that both the employer
and the employee benefit significantly when there exists some protec-
tion against arbitrary discharge.74 It also can be argued from a moral
basis that a rational decision serves the ultimate goals of government
better than one which is arbitrary. Requiring a certain modicum of due
process in discharge cases should enhance the reasonableness and fair-
ness of the decision-maker. Finally, because being fired from a job has
such a tremendous impact upon an individual's self-esteem, procedural
federal employee, 5 U.S.C. §706 (Supp. V 1971). In states with administrative review
acts, the same theory could be applied. This idea could have some import due to the
Court's expansive review of agency administrative actions. Judicial review, however,
would be limited to a determination of whether there was any basis in fact for the conclu-
sion supporting the discharge. See Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401
U.S. 402, 413-16 (1971).
73. It should be noted, however, that no equivalent constitutional protections are pro-
vided to employees in the private sector. See note 63 supra. While they do not have
constitutional protections, those private sector employees who work in unionized plants
have many procedural rights, as well as protection from arbitrary or capricious discharges.
These rights are embodied in a final and binding grievance arbitration clause in most
contracts, which usually includes discharge cases. For a sample of contract clauses relat-
ing to discharge, see LABOR LAw COURSE 2581.01, 2581.07, 2956 (23d ed. CCH 1976). Not
only does the union employee receive notice and a hearing, but he also is assured that the
decision will be made by an impartial third party. This can be contrasted to the public
sector where, even if an employee has a right to a hearing, a third-party decision-maker
is not required. Hortonville Joint School Dist. v. Hortonville Educ. Ass'n., 96 S. Ct. 2308
(1976).
74. Production and efficiency are positively affected by job satisfaction which correlates
with length of employment. Satisfaction can be enhanced by removing threats to job
security. E.J. MCCORMICK & J. TIFFEN, INDUSTRIAL PSYCHOLOGY 321-30 (6th ed. 1974),
citing V. VROOM, WORK & MOTIVATION 186, 283 (1964); Fournet, Distefano, Jr., & Pryer,
Job Satisfaction: Issues and Problems, 19 PERSONNEL PSYCH. 165-83 (1966); Metzner &
Mann, Employee Attitudes and Absences, 6 PERSONNEL PSYCH. 467-85 (1953).
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protections can be said to be of indirect benefit to mental health and
well-being.75
This analysis would not be complete without some discussion of the
difficulties faced by public administrators in a discharge situation when
a trial-type pre-termination hearing is required. A government's ability
to function effectively demands considerable flexibility in managing its
day-to-day operations. While an employee should have notice of the
reasons for his discharge, being locked into an indelibly cast set of proce-
dures may not always serve the goal of efficient delivery of services to
the public."6
Central to providing an optimal level of service is the government's
ability to enforce a specified quality of job performance. In Bishop's
case, one can assume that the decision of the City Manager and the
Police Chief to discharge him was based on a good faith assessment of
inadequate job performance." This conclusion can be fairly drawn be-
cause public administrators are generally subject to intense scrutiny of
their daily operational decisions by their boss, the city council." The
political realities in most municipalities are such that arbitrary dis-
charges will not be tolerated. Thus, it can be argued that the Court in
Bishop finally recognized that the efforts of governments to perform the
services for which they were created often were being significantly im-
75. Similar reasons have been advanced for according substantive due process rights
to public employees in order to protect against discharges unrelated to job performance
or for reasons which have no effect on the agency's efficiency. "Such a legal theory...
would protect the individual's and society's right to maintaining competent, efficient
workers... [and] would also discourage discharges based, in reality, on the exercise of a
constitutional right, but disguised in other terms." The Unclear Boundaries of the Consti-
tutional Rights of Public Employees, 44 U.M.K.C. L. REv. 389, 414 (1976). See generally
Comment, Substantive Due Process: The Extent of Public Employees' Protection from
Arbitrary Dismissal, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1647 (1974).
76. Pre-termination hearings may be costly, both in terms of direct dollar costs and
indirect costs resulting from the diversion of staff time from other productive work. Direct
costs include a court reporter, transcript and legal fees. Examples of indirect costs include
the staff time for investigation of incident, time lost preparing for and attending the
hearing by the personnel officer, supervisor, hearing officer and witnesses, and time lost
from work if the discharged employee is reinstated with back pay. Interview with former
Village Manager, Maywood, Illinois, in Maywood, Illinois (Jan. 30, 1977).
77. See Frug, Does the Constitution Prevent the Discharge of Civil Service Employees?,
124 U. PA. L. REv. 942, 944 (1976), in which the author suggests a distinction be made in
discharge cases between those alleging employee misconduct and those alleging only inef-
ficiency or inadequate performance.
78. Interview with former Village Manager, Maywood, Illinois, in Maywood, Illinois
(Jan. 30, 1977). See also MANAGING THE MODERN CITY 96-98, 101 (J. Banovetz ed. 1970);
E. SCHULZ, AMERICAN CITY GOVERNMENT 401, 409 (1949); H. ZINK, GOVERNMENT OF CITIES
IN THE UNITED STATES 338 (2d ed. 1949).
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paired by trivial complaints of unsatisfactory employees.
An assessment of whether the Bishop holding was "correct" or
"incorrect" must depend upon one's own value judgments. On the one
hand, procedural protections of an individual's source of livelihood as-
sume paramount importance, especially in an era of high unemploy-
ment and instant communications among employers. Yet, as a citizen,
the individual wants assurance that his tax dollars are being wisely
spent.
From a constitutional viewpoint, Bishop clearly signals a narrow con-
struction of the procedural due process rights of public employees.
While this decision will not likely result in a wholesale rewriting of
personnel ordinances or statutes, public employers definitely will have
the dominant role in determining the extent of an employee's property
interest in his job and the procedural protections to be accorded him
when facing discharge.
Bettye S. Kitch
